

Divergences between globalism and right-wing populism on non-Western immigration

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Abstract: Migration is a recurrent phenomenon of human history because it is a successful adaptive strategy of human beings. Although migration today is not of a greater magnitude than in the past, it attracts a great deal of media and academia attention. The present wave of non-Western immigrants into the United States and Europe caused, apart from myriad economic, social and political problems, an ideological dispute between globalism and right-wing populism. Both ideological approaches attract many zealots who spread extreme opinions and poison the whole political life. Using the scholastic method, I examined some opposing points of view of globalists and right-wing populists on several topics regarding non-Western immigration: border control, illegal immigration, limitations of legal immigration, refugee relocation quotas and cultural integration of immigrants. The globalists' and right-wing populists' theses and arguments were checked in regard with established authorities, available factual data and human reason. Highlighting some important topics relating to immigration problem and weighing the main arguments used by globalists and right-wing populists, I also indicate several points of compromise that could help people to moderate their political opinions.

Keywords: immigration, globalism, right-wing populism, cultural integration, multiculturalism

1. Problem

Migration is one of the most important adaptive strategies of human beings. Being governed by the survival instinct and the principle of subjective utility maximization, migration is a constant of human life. Throughout history, myriads of people left their lands and strove to settle in other countries hoping to build a better future. Regardless of whether it is voluntary or forced, temporary or permanent, individual, small-scale or large-scale, local or international, sneaky or overt, peaceful or aggressive, caused by natural disasters and political persecution or motivated by the simple desire to live a better life (Sinha 2005), migration confronts the long-established populations with the problem of sharing their own territory and resources with the newcomers and cohabiting with them. The same drives that impel migrants to move their home to another place — the sur-

vival instinct and the principle of subjective utility maximization — make the established individuals oppose the presence of the newcomers under certain circumstances. The manifestations of this opposition range from biases against immigrants and disparaging language to border closure, pogroms and genocide.

It can be easily seen that migration *per se* is a hypercomplex phenomenon. To trace the changing nature of migration, to describe its innumerable aspects, to point out its particular causes and to predict its immediate or long-term effects would be a formidable or even impossible task. Therefore, I will limit the scope of my investigation to the present impact of non-Western migrants on Euro-Atlantic political sphere. More specifically, I will analyze some aspects of migration from non-European countries to the United States and European Union that cause animosities between the long-established populations and the newcomers, the rise of right-wing populism and a deep rift between the globalists and populist sovereigntists. In addition, I will discuss the integration of people with a non-Western immigrant background into Euro-Atlantic space weighing the globalist and the right-wing populist points of view in terms of reasonableness and convenience.

2. Methodological Approach

The impact of non-Western immigration on Euro-Atlantic political sphere is a complex social phenomenon that consists of countless dynamic and interdependent variables. Some of them are material and objective while others are immaterial and subjective. Very often, in order to understand a particular state of affairs, it is also necessary to take into consideration collateral state of affairs or events. For example, the fact that 12.4% of Sweden's population was made up of people born outside the European Union on January 1, 2017 (Eurostat 2017) or “[o]f the 81,500 decisions handed down by Italian authorities in 2017, eight percent were granted asylum, eight percent subsidiary protection and a quarter humanitarian protection. The remainder were rejected.” (The Local 2018) is an objective state of affairs. On the other hand, the perception of Patrik Jonsson (deputy chair of Hassleholm city council and the Sweden Democrats' regional head in Skane) that “[i]mmigration is costly” (Milne, 2018) and Patrick Buchanan's opinion that immigration is leading to the demise of American culture (cf. Jimenez 2017) are subjective social facts.

This mixture of objective and subjective elements makes it practically impossible to identify cause-and-effect relationships, that is to say, to prove that the change of some variables exerted an irresistible influence on other variables. Interestingly enough, although *the scientific truth* about the effects of non-Western immigration on the European or American public affairs is a valuable intellectual goal, it has no practical implications. Public policies, including those on im-

migration, are not and can not be scientifically substantiated. In liberal democracies, such policies may be considered legitimate only to the extent that they are adopted by the majority of the political body following the debates and clashes of militant wills in the “agonistic public sphere” (Dahlberg 2007). Sometimes, political solutions backed by the general will are not the most consistent with scientific truth. Nevertheless, they are not less legitimate. Moreover, in liberal democracies, even minority or dissenting opinions—in so far as they respect the Constitution and the law—are legitimate and can be expressed publicly even if they contradict the scientific truth and the general will. Every individuals or group are entitled to compete fairly in the liberal-democratic political game in order to get majority support for their proposals. Of course opinion leaders (e.g. academicians, social scientists, journalists, politicians, etc.) are duty-bound to educate people involved in the political struggle so that they could arrive at enlightened opinions and prosocial actions.

An effective research tool for investigating the impact on non-Western immigration on the social, political and cultural fabric of the United States and EU (as it is felt by the militant parties involved) is *scholastic method*. Used as “the common method of teaching and learning in the schools of the Middle Ages after 1200” (NCE 2019), the scholastic method is a way to examine relevant problems in liberal arts from opposing points of view “in order to reach an intelligent, scientific solution that would be consistent with accepted authorities, known facts, human reason, and Christian faith” (NCE 2019). Obviously, nowadays researchers should not verify the results of their investigation according to the dogma of Christian faith, but they are obliged to provide valid knowledge, that is to say, knowledge that is consistent with (a) established authorities, (b) available factual data and (c) human reason. In what follows, I will examine several opposing views on the acceptance and integration of non-Western immigrants in the United States and European Union. Inasmuch as people frequently express their opinions on immigration by means of emotion-laden propositions using “floating signifier” (Laclau 2005) and derogatory labels, it is necessary to adopt the disclaimer that I don't assume the incidental pejorative connotations of some terms used by contending parties.

3. Immigration Debate Topics

The controversial topics on immigration will be discussed moving from general to specific. The order of presentation is not correlated with an order of importance, and it doesn't suggest a chronological evolution of problems.

3.1. Border control

The debates on border control have crystallized two opposite ideological positions, one of *globalism*, and the other of *patriotism* or *populist sovereignty*. Although these antagonistic attitudes towards border control are designated by loaded terms, it is not difficult to recognize the essential principles of them.

Firstly, it can be said that globalism is related to globalization, that is to say, to “international flows of trade, investment and people” (Rachman 2018). The globalization process has accelerated over the last decades, due largely to the development of new (communication) technologies. As with other disruptive movements, globalization has advanced unevenly (e.g. financial capital has moved more freely and faster than people), and it has created winners and defeated. It is not surprising that the beneficiaries of globalization want to deepen it and speed it up while the losers want a rebound movement.

Confident about the virtues of globalization, some winners of globalization—let’s call them “the globalists”—advocate the policy of *open borders*, in other words, they support the *worldwide free movement of people*. Aisha Dodwell expressed this ideological stance very clearly when she stated her main point about border control: “If we care about poverty and justice overseas, we need to start working towards a world of globally open borders for all” (Dodwell 2017). A similar position was adopted by Farhad Manjoo, who “imagined moving from Nigeria to Nebraska as freely as one might move from Massachusetts to Maine” (Manjoo 2019) and formulated the suggestive slogan “Let them in!” (Manjoo 2019).

On the other hand, the adherents of populist sovereignty—let’s call them “the patriots”—denounce “savage globalization” (cf. Dearden 2017) mainly because it belittled them. They aim to “reconquer” their border control together with their legislative, budget and monetary sovereignty (cf. Huggler, 2019). This right-wing populist stance on border control was expressed clearly by Marine Le Pen during a RTL radio broadcast: “We are not a free country if we cannot control our territory.” (Dearden 2017).

It is true that some right-wing populists use the term “globalism” as a boogeyman (Tharoor 2016). It is also true that some of them associate globalism with an “evil plan, pushed by a shadowy crowd of people” (Rachman 2018) without having any evidence. However, these slippings don’t belong to the essence of populist sovereignty. The patriots are not necessarily isolationists and xenophobes. They don’t reject free trade and international cooperation. Their main concern is to preserve the prerogatives of the nation state, especially with regard to border control.

After examining different arguments for and against open borders, one can say that the globalist position is less reasonable than the patriotic stance. For il-

lustration we can look at several arguments for open border advanced by the globalist Aisha Dodwell (2017). As Reece Jones compared the “system of closed borders” with a “system of feudal privilege” (cf. Manjoo 2019), Aisha Dodwell claimed that “[b]orders are a form of global apartheid” and “preserve the privilege of the wealthy at the expense of the poor” (Dodwell 2017). It is not hard to notice that this claim is false. Anyone who says that the enrichment of any person in Massachusetts has impoverished another person in Nigeria affirms implicitly that *all* persons, groups and countries on the planet are caught in a zero-sum game. Evidently, this has never happened in human history and cannot happen in the future. In addition, it is an undeniable fact that the borders *per se* did not enrich the poor people. Within the borders of the same state, no matter how rich it is, there are both rich and poor living together.

Another argument states that “[o]pen borders would make the world a richer place” (Dodwell, 2017). As evidence, Aisha Dodwell cited a claim of economist Michael Clemens, namely that “opening the world’s borders could double global GDP” (Dodwell 2017). It is obvious that such an extravagant claim cannot be substantiated and used as evidence. The last Dodwell’s argument I take into consideration is that “[b]orders produce violence but do not stop immigration” (Dodwell 2017). There are at least two objections to this argument. Firstly, the assertion is contradicted by available factual data. For example, “[i]n 2017 204,219 people crossed an EU border illegally compared to 511,074 in 2016 and 1.8 million in 2015” (McGuinness 2018). It can easily be seen that the tight control of the borders has led to a dramatic decrease of illegal immigration. Secondly, if borders produce sporadic violence, the total absence of borders would produce ongoing domestic violence. No human agency could enforce the rules of peaceful conduct on a global scale.

Perceived as egoistic, isolationists or xenophobes, the right-wing populist stance on border problem has the advantage of tradition. History proves that border control exercised by nation state institutions yielded positive results, with the amendment that a total closure of the borders *always* condemns a nation to underdevelopment and poverty. The “controlled border” option is better than the “open border” alternative only if populist sovereigntists accept that nowadays borders are inherently porous, due to the new communication technologies and interconnected economic system. The magnitude and speed of international economic exchanges require new methods of border control. A state that resorts to outdated methods and procedures to control its border risks to be marginalized in the worldwide economic system. The assertion that the patriotic position on border control is more reasonable than the globalist one does not justify any policy to silence the globalists. In fact, both solutions—globalism and populist sovereignty—are imperfect. We can find the most appropriate answer to the problem of border control only by critical discussions and vivid debates between the

most qualified representatives of these antagonistic positions. This answer has the highest chances of being accepted as the basis of a public policy on border control.

3.2. Illegal immigration

With regard to border control, it is easy to demonstrate that the extreme views of globalists and sovereigntists are equally wrong. The policy of open border leads to anarchy or tyranny while the strategy of closed borders causes isolation and backwardness. The optimal position—*controlled border*—belongs to populist sovereigntism, but the most appropriate degree of control depends on the peculiarities of each society and the international context.

The globalists and the right-wing populists have antagonistic views on illegal immigration too, but this time we cannot say that only some of them are right or wrong. Illegal immigrants form a very heterogeneous class of people, and the personal, social and humanitarian issues they raise are very different. Undocumented immigrants either crossed the border illegally or crossed the border with visas but stayed after they expired (Amadeo 2019). Sometimes, governments themselves increase the number of illegal immigrants by changing legislation. For example, Matteo Villa, a researcher at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, says “removing humanitarian protections could create 70,000 more undocumented migrants in Italy by 2020” (cf. Mezzofiore 2018).

The right-wing populists prefer a *legalistic* approach to illegal immigration, ignoring (very often) the humanitarian aspects of the problem. For example, under the new law advanced by the populist Italian Government, “some migrants will lose their protected legal status and as a result will have to leave immigration centers, putting them into legal limbo—without the prospect of a job, healthcare assistance or social integration” (cf. Mezzofiore 2018). In the same way, Marine Le Pen declared that illegal immigrants “have no reason to stay in France” because they “broke the law the minute they set foot on French soil” (cf. Nowak & Branford 2017), and the Trump administration implemented a “zero tolerance policy toward undocumented immigrants” even if it would prompt the separation of thousands of children from their parents (Andone 2018). The drastic attitude of “the patriots” towards illegal immigration is expressed concisely in the 25th engagement of presidential program assumed by the National Rally: “To make it impossible to regularize or naturalize foreigners in an illegal situation. To simplify and automatize their expulsion.” (The Rassemblement National 2017)

On the other hand, the globalists tend to treat illegal immigration from a *humanitarian* point of view, disregarding the law and appealing for civil resistance (Mezzofiore, 2018). The opposition to the national or federal government’s ef-

fort to enforce immigration law and deport back illegal immigrants to the countries of origin generated – among others – *sanctuary city movement*. Municipal jurisdictions involved in this movement transformed their cities or counties into “protective shields” that “stand in the way of federal efforts to pinpoint and deport people at random” (Sakuma 2016). Three years ago, in the United States, 39 cities and 364 counties refused to cooperate with U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement for repatriating illegal immigrants (Sakuma 2016). Similar actions have also occurred in Belgium, France, Greece and other European countries (Têcheur 2018).

One can easily see that the two positions outlined above are extreme. The populist sovereigntists should accept that the severity of the law must be felt—first of all—by people who create victims and prejudice using fraud and violence. If peacefully integrated into host society, undocumented immigrants may not be deported quickly and brutally ignoring the complicated socio-economic network in which they are involved. The more time undocumented immigrants lived in the host country, the longer the eventual process of repatriating should be. They are not entitled to receive full citizenship, but the option of naturalization should be available for them.

On the other hand, neither municipal authorities nor illegal immigrants should openly defy the law even if it seems unfair. Inasmuch as people are entitled to equal protection under the law, they are also obliged to respect the law. In particular, undocumented immigrants should avoid asking with impertinence to be naturalized. For any illegal immigrant, citizenship would be a gift not a right. In addition, undocumented immigrants should avoid being involved in political struggles. Otherwise, they could be perceived as intruders in the local political body or as a dangerous political weapon (that should be eliminated).

Beyond its legal and humanitarian aspects, the problem of illegal immigration presents many practical difficulties mainly because the number of undocumented immigrants is unusually high. According to Amanda Sakuma (2016), more than 11 million undocumented immigrants live in the U.S. Organized as liberal democracies, Western countries cannot simply deport the undocumented immigrants because even “illegal aliens” have the right to protection of the law. The repatriation of immigrants can only be done on a case-by-case basis following many complicated legal procedures. It is also necessary to take into consideration the financial cost of repatriation as well as the economic losses caused by the disappearance of many jobs.

In conclusion, the problem of illegal immigration is neither strictly legal nor purely humanitarian. In other words, neither deportation nor unconditional integration is an optimal solution for it. The globalists and the right-wing populists should reach a reasonable compromise, strengthening the rule of law and helping people in need to improve their lives.

3.3. Limitations on legal immigration

Regarding legal immigration, the globalists and the right-wing populists have many similar points of view. It is generally accepted that Western countries are aging nations with a stagnant population. They have to compete on the global stage with colossi as India, China and Brazil, but, unfortunately, they are increasingly short of workers (Manjoo 2019). Therefore, governments encourage financially self-sufficient, talented and highly skilled people to pursue career options in their countries (Salam 2019). In general, lower-skilled workers face a more restrictive regime of legal immigration. Fewer workers from overseas are allowed to take up lower-skilled jobs in the Western labor market (Farage 2018).

Although legal immigration of foreign workers satisfies a real need on the labor market, governments are pressed to impose certain limits to it. For example, UK government allows only around 20,000 higher-skilled workers to enter British labor market each year (Farage 2018). In 2017, Trump endorsed a Senate bill that curbs legal immigration (Amadeo 2019). As French presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen promised to reduce legal immigration to an annual balance of 10,000 (The Rassemblement National 2017). As a rule, trade unions and the adherents of economic nationalism demand more restrictions on legal immigration of foreign workers.

Legal immigration of foreign workers doesn't divide too much the globalists and the sovereigntists. The financial implications of immigration motivate both parties to curb it. For example, "[i]mmigrants have a net cost to the U.S. government of \$11.4 billion to \$20.2 billion annually", and "[i]f the U.S. granted illegal immigrants amnesty, their costs to society would double (Amadeo 2019). However, regarding legal immigration on the whole, the sovereigntists adopt a tougher stance, pressing for additional restrictions. They don't want foreigners to acquire citizenship automatically by marriage, family reunification or the right of the soil and aim to remove dual non-European citizenship (The Rassemblement National 2017).

Many right-wing populists are concerned about the evolution of their country's demographic structure. In particular, they are worried that the non-white population of immigrants grows much more than the established white population. Statistical data like "[m]ore than one out of ten people in the United States was born in another country, and one in four has at least one parent who was born in another country" (Jimenez 2017) strike fear in the hearts of right-wing populists because they suggest a dramatic shift in the power structure. Demographic changes don't constitute an objective basis for limiting legal immigration of non-Western foreigners, but people who are subjectively concerned about them have the right to politicize their anguish.

3.4. Refugee relocation quotas

The opposition between globalism and sovereignty overlaps with the antagonism between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Supranationalists believe that national governments should give a large amount of their power to institutions and authorities which in theory are placed higher than the state (e.g. UN, NATO, EU, etc.). On the other hand, intergovernmentalists focus on the importance of national states in the process of creating worldwide regulations (Colletaz 2013).

The European migrants crisis emphasized the resistance of local and national communities to the implementation of humanitarian programs on a global scale without their explicit consent. Between 2010 and 2013, 5,571,916 non-EU migrants came from North Africa and Middle East in Europe (European Commission 2015). Most of them came from Muslim-majority countries. The massive wave of refugees put a severe strain on southern European countries such as Greece and Italy. Under these exceptional circumstances, the EU in cooperation with the UN's refugee agency launched a resettlement program in order to provide particularly vulnerable refugees with a direct and secure route to Europe (Koeh & Wallace 2018). Some European countries such as Germany, Sweden, Italy, Greece, France and Great Britain have generously accepted a large number of migrants (European Commission 2015; Koch & Wallace 2018), while other countries such as Denmark, Hungary and Poland have rejected the refugee quota system (The Local 2018). A special case is Sweden. "During Europe's 2015 migrant crisis Sweden took in a record 163,000 asylum seekers, many of them Muslims from war-torn Syria and Iraq. It was the highest such intake in the EU, per head of population" (BBC 2018). The disruptive presence of a large number of migrants has prompted many citizens in the host countries to defy supranational authorities and to portray the European Union as a "remote, almost foreign authority which makes decisions and forces them on its member states" (Colletaz 2013).

As expected, in the countries that received the most refugees, the right-wing populist parties increased their voter share at the expense of so-called mainstream or governmental parties. The UK Independence Party, the Alternative for Germany, Sweden Democrats, the Northern League in Italy, the National Rally in France, the Party for Freedom in Netherlands, the Freedom Party of Austria, etc. are no longer fringe political parties. Despite the harsh critics of mainstream media, these parties and their candidates have won millions of vote and got involved in governmental structures.

It can be said that the populist backlash against the globalist approach to refugee crisis has a positive effect. Ostracized by mainstream media and governmental parties, right-wing populist parties promoted an Eurosceptic agenda. They

distrusted all pan-European institutions (European Parliament, European Commission, European Central Bank, the euro, the Schengen Agreement, etc.), and their top priority was to leave the European Union. The memes Brexit, Frexit, Italexit, Dexit, Swexit etc. became the order of the day. Soon after they won popular support and took an active part in legislative and governmental affairs, right-wing populist parties have moderated their discourse. Being increasingly confident about the reliability of European political institutions, populist sovereigntists try to promote their political agenda *within* the European Union. At present, they seek to gain momentum in the upcoming European Parliament elections in May 2019 (De Maio 2019). Very likely, there will be no other exit after Brexit.

3.5. Cultural integration of non-Western immigrants

Immigrant integration policies arouse enormous controversy and opposition between globalists and right-wing populists, especially when it comes to Muslim immigrants. In theory, it's only a matter of time until immigrants develop a "sense of belonging to the host society" (Laurentsyeve & Venturini 2017) and, in return, native population accepts the newcomers as full members of the society. In reality, this dual process develops sinuously and causes lots of frictions between natives and newcomers, and these tensions permeate all layers of society. Both globalists and right-wing populists recognize that there is a rift between the established population and non-Western immigrants at least temporarily, but they correlate it with different causal factors and provide contrasting solutions.

In order to neutrally explain the gap between natives and immigrants and the difficulties of integration, one can take into consideration immigrants' demographic characteristics (age, ethnicity, education, household composition, professional status, etc.), immigrants' resources (language skills, levels of income, access to certain areas of social life, political influence, etc.), the impact of new communication technologies and the immigrants' exposure to peculiar cultural factors in their families, ethnic neighborhoods or countries of origin (Laurentsyeve & Venturini 2017). Unfortunately, both globalists and right-wing populists prefer *biased* explanations and solutions to the neutral ones. They could equally admit that culture means "the psychological orientation toward social objects" (namely beliefs, feeling and values) and integration represents "the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group" (cf. Lijphart 1971). However, they could not treat the process of cultural integration in the same way because their ideological frames and political goals are diverging markedly. Inasmuch as these one-sided explanations and proposals prompt many people to support or oppose certain

immigrant integration policies, it is necessary to know them before trying to correct them.

In general, the populist sovereigntists tend to be *assimilationists*. Holding such a view, they expect non-Western immigrants "to melt into the [homogeneous] mainstream culture through an inter-generational process of cultural, social, and economic integration" (Algan et al. 2012: 4). More exactly, immigrant groups are required to give up their ancestral culture completely in order to acquire the memories, sentiments, attitudes, values and behavior patterns of the natives (cf. Jimenez 2017: 6-7). If absorbed into the cultural mainstream of the Euro-Atlantic area, immigrants would share the unique cultural identity of the host society. In the "soft" version of assimilationism, immigrants are expected to adopt only the *mainstream political culture* of the established population, in other words, "that sector of the general culture which is especially concerned with the means and ends of government" (Lijphart 1971: 4). Once immersed in the mainstream political culture of the Euro-Atlantic area, non-Western immigrants would not instrumentalize their ethnic, racial and religious particularities in political contests.

It is almost self-evident that the maximalist version of assimilationism does not fit contemporary Western societies. The late 19th and early 20th century was indeed a period of successful nationalistic programs. The nation-states of Europe strove and largely succeeded "to homogenize their entire territory culturally and linguistically, as well as economically and socially" (cf. Dijkstra et al. 2001: 56). Nowadays, the unprecedented forces of globalization make such nationalistic programs obsolete. Globalization "fosters favorable conditions for all sorts of particularization, localization and even fragmentation" (cf. Dijkstra et al. 2001: 58) so that almost every Western society presents the image of a cultural mosaic. Given this situation, it is hard to believe that non-Western immigrants will want and will be able to assimilate the complex culture of the host society.

Furthermore, it is important to take into consideration both the cultural background of immigrants and the specific strata of host society that absorb them. High-educated, high-skilled and rich immigrants have a fair chance to internalize the new and complex cultural values, but the destitute newcomers cannot cope with such a cultural shock. Perhaps that's why many unfortunate immigrants—absorbed in the lowest layers of host society—tend to insulate themselves from the long-established population, crowding together into certain areas and displaying religious or cultural tokens of their natal countries in an ostentatious manner. They use such tokens as a shield against the cultural forces of host society that are perceived as disruptive and oppressive.

Non-Western immigrants have also great difficulty in adopting the mainstream political culture, as understood by the right-wing populists. According to the narrow sense of liberal democracy, nobody should instrumentalize ethnic,

racial and religious particularities in the political contests. Starting from here, populist sovereigntists reject the idea of “shared citizenship”, the right of immigrants to use affiliation with their ethnic group and coreligionists as a political tool and the immigrants’ practice of displaying their cultural and religious differences in the public domain. Some Muslim opinion leaders reply that “[Islam] has a hierarchy of values such as human dignity, tolerance, liberty, equality, and respect for human rights, democratic values, and religious values” (Raja 2012: 110). Moreover, they assert that “[o]ne can be a practicing Muslim and live in a secular, pluralist and democratic society” (Raja 2012: 110). Islam dress code and religious habits should not be regarded as a “symbol of patriarchy, suppression, extremism” or as a “sign of lacking integration of the whole Muslim community within European society” (Raja 2012: 110), but as an indication that the religion of Islam is the innermost part of European-Muslim identity (Raja 2012: 118). Therefore, Europe’s Muslims could not manifest themselves in the public sphere in a pure secular manner, and the established population should accept this state of affair.

Actually, liberal-democratic regime are working well in the Euro-Atlantic area inasmuch as people are discouraged from using religious, ethnic or racial motives in their political struggles. History provided countless evidence that religious, ethnic or racial instrumentalization of public affairs stirred up many troubles and bloody wars. For this reason, the right-wing populists are right when they ask people (including Muslim immigrants) to use only secular means in the political contests. Unfortunately, this sound secular position is undermined by the general practice of asserting particular identities in the political life. If it is acceptable to present oneself in the public sphere with a gender, ethnic or racial identity, why Muslim immigrants should not display their religious identity? Ultimately, the religious identity is more important to Muslim immigrants than is gender identity for some natives.

In sharp contrast to the right-wing populists, the globalists adopt a *multiculturalist* perspective on the cultural integration of immigrants. Following the dictum “Diversity is our greatest strength”, the globalists praise diversity and equality. They flatly reject not just the assimilationist endeavor but any attempt to increase cultural homogeneity or to compare and hierarchize different cultural values or practices.

Multiculturalists are right saying that immigrants are not “passive subjects in front of the forces of assimilation”, but active persons who “shape their own identities” (Algan et al. 2012: 5). They are also right asserting that immigrants *nolens volens* preserve some “alien” cultural characteristics “in a state of uneasy co-existence with the attitudes of the host country (Algan et al. 2012: 5). Therefore, long-established individuals have to accommodate themselves to immigrants’ cultural peculiarities and treat these newcomers as “active integral seg-

ments of the whole society” and not as “foreigners or outsiders” (Algan et al. 2012: 5).

However, the globalist view on the cultural integration of non-Western immigrants has several weakness. Firstly, multiculturalists make the mistake of putting all cultural characteristics at the same level and attaching derogatory labels (e.g. “xenophobe”, “Islamophobe”, “extremist”, etc.) to those natives who criticize some values, beliefs, attitudes, behaviors or habits of immigrants. In fact, although there are no flawless cultural product, it is reasonable to argue that some cultural values and practices are *more appropriate* for a society than others. Everybody has the right to politely express his doubts, reservations or opposition to any cultural aspects both of natives and immigrants *without fear*.

Secondly, multiculturalists do not take into consideration a certain limit of diversity. No society can hold inconsistent cultural values and practices in the long term. As pertinently remarked by the leader of the Dutch Christian Democrats, Jan-Peter Balkenende, “[s]ociety could not be an aggregate of multiple cultures; it should be a coherent civil community with shared norms and values” (cf. Uitermark 2012: 97). Many non-Western immigrants lack cultural literacy, that is to say, the ability to understand and participate fluently in the culture of host society. As a result, increasing diversity leads progressively to separation, (self-) segregation, marginalization, civil strife and disintegration.

Finally, attentive to the newcomers’ needs, multiculturalists unjustly overlook the growing concern of some natives about the immigration issue. It is an undeniable fact that host society unequally absorbs the newcomers. Generally speaking, the globalist opinion leaders don’t live together with the most destitute newcomers and don’t carry the burden of integrating them. That’s why they tend to underestimate the disruptive influence of some non-Western immigrants in certain strata of host society. The right-wing populist parties won a significant number of votes not necessarily where immigrants are the most numerous, but where the burden on the natives is heavier.

4. Conclusions

Migration has been a perennial problem since the beginning of human history. Although migration today is not of a greater magnitude than in the past, it manifests itself in a more dramatic form. Many non-Western immigrants choose the Euro-Atlantic countries as host societies because they are rich. That’s true, but it is also true that these countries are complex, sophisticated and, consequently, fragile; a greater influx of newcomers can upset their dynamic equilibrium at any time. International organizations, national governments, NGOs and other social agencies strive to cope with migration problem under close media scrutiny. Journalists rapidly castigate the authorities involved in migration problem

for any abuse or mistake. Last but not least, migration issues have become battle lines between globalists and right-wing populists.

Using the scholastic method, I examined some opposing points of view of globalists and right-wing populist on several topics. The globalists' and populist sovereigntists' theses and arguments were checked in regard with established authorities, available factual data and human reason. In brief, both globalists and "patriots" hold extreme positions, but the patriots' opinions seem to be more reasonable than globalists' standpoints. Regarding border problem, many globalists support the absurd idea of "open borders" or "worldwide free movement of people". Obviously, the patriots' proposal of controlled border is more acceptable. Due to the fact that liberal democracies are open and charitable societies, it is not reasonable and fair to encourage illegal immigration, as the globalists did. The right-wing populists have the right to demand that governments fight against illegal immigration, but they are totally wrong when they recommend using brutal means against peaceful illegal immigrants. In regard with the limitations of legal immigration, the right-wing populists seem to be less reasonable and more egoistic. Perhaps the globalists are more qualified to establish the most appropriate restrictions of legal immigration taking also into considerations the needs of immigrants' natal countries. To impose refugee relocation quotas by means of international agreements without consulting the native citizens is a terrible mistake. It causes a climate of mistrust and undermines democratic institutions. Finally, cultural integration of immigrants is a problem that doesn't admit a one-sided solution. Assimilationists and multiculturalists should reach a compromise that is concordant with our highly globalized world and the need for homogeneity of host societies.

My scholastic exercise was not meant to decide between globalism and right-wing populism. Ultimately, both ideological positions are extreme. The fundamental goal of the study was to highlight the main topics relating to immigration problem and some possible points of compromise that could help globalists and populist sovereigntists to moderate their positions.

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Inhalt

Vorwort der Herausgeber 7

Migration und Gastfreundschaft: interdisziplinäre Annäherungen

Wilhelm Dancă

Dem Migranten muss man helfen.

Einige Motivationen christlicher Anthropologie 11

Ioan Alexandru Tofan

Some Considerations about Hospitality 27

Raluca Rădulescu

Orchideen als kulturelle Metapher für Flüchtlinge und Migranten 37

Iveta Leitane

Migration der Intellektuellen: Ideologie und Utopie 47

Dariusz Wojtaszyn

Sportverräter: Migration der DDR-Sportlerinnen

und -Sportler in den Westen 73

Gheorghe-Ilie Fârte

Divergences between globalism and

right-wing populism on non-Western immigration 87

Valentina Șpune

Migration der Ding-Bilder. Ein anderes Verständnis der Migration 105

Kontextualisierungen und Fallbeispiele

Alexander Ronay

Deutsche Migranten nach Rumänien. Martin Opitz in Siebenbürgen 119

Peter Varga

Parallele und konkurrierende Erinnerungskulturen

in Mitteleuropa in Bezug auf Migration früher und heute 128

Dorota Kudyba, Wojciech Kudyba

Das Bild eines Immigranten aus Mitteleuropa in englischsprachiger Prosa 136

Stanislava Gálová, Ivana Grežová

Deutschunterricht und sprachliche Erstorientierung
für Flüchtlinge und dafür geeignete Lehrwerke..... 147

Jana Juhásová

Migration in der Jugendliteratur und Thematisierung
dieses Phänomens im Deutsch als Fremdsprache-Unterricht 161

Miscellanea

Claudiu T. Arieșan

Visualizing the Resurrection. The Symbol of the Phoenix
in Classical, Scripturistic and Patristic Contexts and its Modern Realms 175

Autorinnen und Autoren..... 186

Vorwort der Herausgeber

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Migration und Integration sind derzeit weltweit Gegenstand vielfältiger Diskussionen in der Politik, in der Gesellschaft und in den Medien, aber auch in der Wissenschaft. Viele internationale Forschungsprojekte beschäftigen sich mit dem Thema, zahlreiche wissenschaftliche Ergebnisse liegen bereits in Fachbüchern und Sammelbänden vor.

Im Rahmen der Konferenz wurden die Phänomene der Migration (dazu auch der Flucht, Auswanderung, Deportation, des Exils usw.) und Integration aus verschiedenen Perspektiven (kulturgeschichtlich, historisch, theologisch, philosophisch, soziologisch, politisch, literatur- und sprachwissenschaftlich usw.) betrachtet.

Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Dancă, Dekan der Theologischen Fakultät aus Bukarest, stellt die Gastfreundschaft in den Fokus seines Vortrages, die zwei Seiten hat, und keine davon ist einfach: Es ist das jeweils einseitige Geben und Nehmen, das Probleme bereitet. Und was sollen wir tun, wenn wir als Reaktion auf unser Geben keine Dankbarkeit erfahren? „Am Ende sollst du durch das Geben selbst empfangen“ beantwortete er die Frage. Er wies auch auf die Schwierigkeiten hin, zentral sei aber die Perspektive, die man dem Unbekannten gegenüber einnimmt, und dabei ist die Gastfreundschaft auf persönlicher Ebene klar von der politischen zu trennen.

Diese Unterscheidung griff Ass. Prof. Dr. Ioan Alexandru Tofan aus Iași auf, der drei philosophische Konzepte von Gastfreundschaft vorstellte: Während Immanuel Kant diese als einen vom Staat gewährten, zeitlich begrenzten Aufenthalt in einem bestimmten Gebiet definierte und damit ein rein politisches Konzept vertrat, sprach der französische Philosoph Jacques Derrida von einer „Erfahrung von Gastfreundschaft“ als der persönlichen Aufnahme von Bedürftigen in einer globalen Welt, in der Staatsgrenzen unbedeutend sind. Der rumänische Geistliche Andrei Scrima schließlich vertrat das Konzept der „absoluten Gastfreundschaft“, nach der Gastfreundschaft nicht bedeutet, zu geben, sondern vielmehr – in einem spirituellen Verständnis –, zu sein.

<i>Stanislava Gálová, Ivana Grežová</i> Deutschunterricht und sprachliche Erstorientierung für Flüchtlinge und dafür geeignete Lehrwerke.....	147
---	-----

<i>Jana Juhásová</i> Migration in der Jugendliteratur und Thematisierung dieses Phänomens im Deutsch als Fremdsprache-Unterricht	161
--	-----

Miscellanea

<i>Claudiu T. Arieșan</i> Visualizing the Resurrection. The Symbol of the Phoenix in Classical, Scripturistic and Patristic Contexts and its Modern Realms	175
--	-----

Autorinnen und Autoren.....	186
-----------------------------	-----

Vorwort der Herausgeber

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